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1.  Introduction 
 
Two of the key challenges facing the United Kingdom in the late 1970s were energy scarcity 
and unemployment1.  The challenges faced today are not dissimilar. Climate change is an 
overarching imperative and a pivotal driver for the development of alternative sources of 
energy, energy efficiency and the reduction of carbon emissions. The current financial crisis 
has inevitably been accompanied by a surge in the rate of unemployment and efforts to move 
towards recovery are underpinned by the facilitation of development.  On the face of it, we are 
in a similar place.  However, much has changed in the past three decades in the planning law 
arena.  There have been key external developments (both international and national) such as 
the adoption of the Aarhus Convention2 and the Human Rights Act3.  Significantly, for the 
purposes of this examination, the public participation ideology, nascent in the late 1970s, has 
become increasingly embedded in legislation as well as finding recognition in the courts. Much 
has changed in the legal framework of planning in England and Wales and there have been 
numerous changes in policy with accompanying legislative instruments. This article revisits 
the three legal ideologies proposed by Professor Patrick McAuslan over thirty years ago in an 
attempt to establish where the balance lies between them in one aspect of modern day planning 
law.  The development of the public participation ideology is charted and an analysis of the 
law governing key areas of development control is undertaken in order to draw conclusions as 
to how the competing ideologies interact today and which of the ideologies (if any) is dominant.  
 
2.  The Ideologies of Planning Law 
 
In his seminal 1980 publication ‘The Ideologies of Planning Law’, Professor McAuslan 
advanced the theses that land use planning law lacked objectivity and neutrality and that the 
law itself was a major contributory factor behind the disarray of planning.  He further argued 
that this lack of objectivity and neutrality existed because the law is based upon three 
competing ideologies.4  McAuslan proposed these to be; first the traditional common law view 
that the role of the law is to protect private property; second that the law exists to serve the 
public interest; and third that the law serves the cause of public participation.5  He then 
proceeded to examine the law in three areas of the planning system of the time, exploring the 
role of each of the ideologies in; public participation and debate, public development and 
initiatives and public regulation of private development and activities.  
 
2.1 The Traditional Common Law Approach 
 
The first of McAuslan’s ideologies will be familiar to all legal scholars.  It is an approach to 
the law which flows from the close relationship between private property ownership and the 
law. Historically the two have always been closely intertwined and the idea that the role of law 
exists to uphold the constitution and property can be traced back to Locke in the seventeenth 
century.6 Until relatively recent times, politics and law-making have remained the exclusive 
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preserve of property owners.  The judiciary and lawyers themselves are more often than not 
owners of property and steeped in a legal tradition that long predates the advent of legislation 
and judicial intervention to protect the public good.   
When faced with legislation enacted to improve the living conditions of the urban working 
classes and giving government powers to control the use of property, it is not surprising that 
land owners turned to the courts to protect their interests, nor that the courts were sympathetic 
to their cause.7 It is in the principles developed by the courts in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries to protect landowners that the common law or private property ideology 
can be recognised8.   
2.2 The Public Interest Ideology 
 
Alongside the traditional common law approach another ideology has gained influence during 
the last century.  The public interest ideology can itself be traced back in time to the writings 
of Bentham in the late eighteenth century.9  This view of the law sees its role as one of providing 
legitimacy for action taken in the public interest.10 Whereas the private property perspective 
can be recognised in the arguments of lawyers and decisions of the courts, the public interest 
ideology is evident in the actions and decisions of the public administrator.  In order to serve 
the public interest the law gives wide powers to administrators, which often give rise to conflict 
with the traditional rights of private property ownership. 
In more recent times, the courts, themselves, have come to recognise the legitimacy of 
administrative action in the public interest.  With the advent of the twentieth century, lawyers 
and judges began to become familiar with the role of morality in law espoused by Bentham 
and this acceptance of the public interest ideology can be recognised in the case law of the 
higher courts in the early 1900s11. Planning law is characterised by legislation that is motivated 
by the public interest ideology but yet often attempts to recognise the interests of private land 
owners. Planning disputes in the courts have seen a vacillation between the traditional common 
law approach and the recognition of the legitimacy of the actions of public officials in the 
interest of the public who act in good faith and are ultimately accountable to Parliament.12  
2.3 Public Participation 
The third ideology identified by McAuslan rests in the proposition that, inherent in the law, 
should be mechanisms for the public to be consulted and involved in decision making 
processes.  Although, as he notes,13 this ideology also has philosophical roots in the writing of 
J.S.Mill,14 it has only become a recognisable force with its own constituency relatively recently.  
At the time of writing in 1978, McAuslan saw this ideology as of equal importance to the two 
outlined above, but as the least developed in terms of both policy and law.15 As will be 
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illustrated below, this third ideology has grown in substance in these respects in the past thirty 
years or so. 
The basic premise of the principle of public participation in the context of planning law is that 
the public should have rights of participation in decisions on land use planning, not because of 
any property interests but in the interests of democracy and justice.16  This notion naturally 
brings the ideology of public participation into conflict with the private property/common law 
approach. It also does not sit comfortably with the public interest ideology.  Public 
administrators acting in the public interest in accordance with the law can tend to do so in a 
paternalistic way without necessarily allowing meaningful public participation in their decision 
making. 
3.  The Balance in Planning Law of the 1970’s 
 
Of the three areas of planning law surveyed by McAuslan, public participation was considered 
both at local and central levels.  At a local level he concluded that the dominant ideology of 
the time was public interest.  Any deviance towards public involvement, he argued, was 
motivated by the ideology of private property and public participation did not then have a 
significant position.17  Similarly in looking at public participation at a central level, he 
concluded that the mechanisms in place at the time were not motivated by the ideology of 
public participation, but dominated by the ideology of public interest.  Any innovations in 
public debate he suggested were ‘designed to control and not advance public participation – to 
steer it into acceptable channels’.18 At a central level also, he argued that any headway made 
in public participation was through the service of the private property ideology.  His 
overarching conclusion at the time of writing was that law, which might appear to be designed 
to increase public participation, was, in fact, grounded in the ideology of public interest.  Where 
public participation provisions did appear these, he argued, were catering to the interests of 
private property rather than the public at large.19  
In reaching a judgement as to where the balance between the competing ideologies lay in the 
area of public development, McAuslan looked at compulsory purchase and compensation, 
clearance area policy and practice and community land.  These are areas of planning law 
firmly underpinned by the fundamental ideology of society and as such, on the face of it, are 
most closely aligned to the public interest ideology.   In the sphere of compulsory purchase 
and compensation, the principle statute of the time was the Compulsory Purchase Act, 1965, 
which, on examination, largely replicated the Land Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845.  As 
such, the statutory provisions were, in fact, rooted in the interests of private property and, in 
particular, ensuring that private landowners were sufficiently compensated.  This was also 
reflected in the decisions of the courts after the 1965 Act came into force.20 Although both 
public and private interest ideologies are recognisable in the Act, McAuslan notes that the 
procedural and administrative provisions of the Act, whilst having as their goal the protection 
of private property, were placed ‘firmly within the context of getting on with public 
development’.21 There were no explicit provisions for public participation within the 1965 
Act, but one of its aims was to lessen public opposition to development by increasing the size 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 No. 1 at p. 38 
18 No. 1 at p. 73 
19 Ibid. 
20 For example, Birmingham Corporation v West Midland Baptist (Trust) Association (Incorporated) [1969] 3 
All E.R. 172. 
21 No. 1 at p. 116. 
and opportunities for compensation22.  The fact that public opposition to developments 
continued, reinforced McAuslan’s conclusion that public participators formed a separate 
constituency of interest, which was the basis of an ideology of its own right23. 
 
The two other areas of public development under consideration by McAuslan are of less 
relevance today, relating to clearance areas and the ill-fated Community Land Act, 1975.  A 
common theme was unveiled in which the two dominant ideologies were those of public 
interest and private interest.  Despite the fact that all these measures were prima facie in the 
public interest, there was an inherent nod to the power of private property interests and an 
alliance between the two competing interests in order to preserve the status quo24.  What is 
apparent in all the areas under examination is that, at the time of writing, public participation 
was barely recognisable as a force.  Neither public officials nor the courts favoured 
arguments from the public or challenges to public action25.  
 
The final area of law under examination by McAuslan spans development control and the 
control of housing conditions.  In development control, more than any other area of planning 
law, the role of lawyers and the courts has been at its most significant26. This, in itself, can be 
seen as a triumph of the ideology of private property27.  McAuslan considered two specific 
areas of development control; planning conditions and material considerations. After 
examining a number of cases relating to planning conditions, he concluded that the courts 
were firmly aligned to the private property ideology, albeit with different parameters for rural 
and urban planning.  In turning his attention to material considerations in planning, 
McAuslan recognised an ‘oscillation between private property and public interest’ in the 
cases under consideration, but, on balance, he concluded that the courts favoured private 
property interests, reflecting their grounding in the private property ideology28.  No doubt as a 
consequence of the limited degree of public participation in development control at the time, 
there was little consideration given to the influence of this ideology in the equation.  In 
contrast, when looking at the control of housing conditions, the public participation ideology 
was clearly recognisable at this time.  However, the picture presented is one of the two 
dominant ideologies of private and public interests, whilst remaining in competition, 
supporting one another, particularly against the ideology of public participation29.  This 
alliance, it is argued, stems from the notion that it is ultimately in the public interest to 
preserve the institution of private property and the market mechanisms within which these 
interests operate30.  
 
What emerges from the examination of all three of these areas of planning law is the 
suggestion that the adjustment to reach a balance or status quo is the product of what lies 
beneath any notion of the ideologies of law; this being the ideology of society. At the core of 
the ideology of society, according to McAuslan, is ‘the maintenance and preservation of the 
system of private property’31.  If it is accepted that private property interests provide the basis 
                                                          
22 Ibid. 
23 No. 1 at p. 117 
24 No. 1 at p. 141. 
25 No. 1 at p. 101. 
26 No. 1 at p. 147. 
27 Ibid. 
28 No. 1 at p. 180. 
29 No. 1 at p. 209. 
30 No. 1 at p. 210. 
31 No. 1 at p. 145. 
of both societal and legal ideologies, then public participation will naturally be marginalised 
and the balance will always skew towards the private property ideology32.  
 
4.  The Current Context 
 
The scale of change across a range of factors that impact upon the legal ideologies 
underpinning planning law over the past three decades or more has been vast.  Not only have 
there been significant changes in the legal framework of planning, but we have also seen the 
introduction of extrinsic legal instruments, which may have altered the balance between the 
ideologies identified by McAuslan in the late 1970s.  In particular, legislation providing for 
freedom of information33 and public participation34 and an increasingly rights based rhetoric 
leading up to the introduction of the Human Rights Act of 1998. Alongside developments in 
the law, the Thatcherite era saw a major change in the political approach to town planning.  
Since the time of McAuslan’s writing, there have been moves to both centralise and 
decentralise the planning regime as well as numerous changes in the administration of 
planning.  Planning guidance has become increasingly influential and burgeoned and then 
recently become more contained.  
 
These developments warrant a fresh look at the balance between the three originally 
identified ideologies. In the preface to his work, McAuslan distinguished the term ideology 
from philosophy and asserted that the former term embraces ‘values, attitudes, assumptions, 
“hidden inarticulate premises”35, which can be recognised in a range of written sources.  In 
addition to the ideologies that shape the law, there are those that mould politics and society.  
Indeed, McAuslan recognised that the ideology of society was fundamental to the balance 
between public and private interest and public participation36.  The respective force of these 
ideologies is based upon power and at the same time influenced by financial and 
environmental factors.  Acknowledged by McAuslan, and acceded here, is the inherently 
subjective nature of identifying and evaluating competing ideologies from written work given 
that one’s own ideologies will have an inevitable tendency to intervene37.  Nonetheless, an 
attempt will be made to draw conclusions as to where the balance lies today between the 
three ideologies in the system of development control in England and Wales. Restricting the 
examination to development control keeps it manageable and it is in this area, in particular, 
where a shift in balance might be expected.   
 
5.  Public Participation 
 
Much of the analysis will focus upon the development of public participation in the law and 
policy relating to development control.  First, it is helpful to understand and chart the 
development of this more recent legal ideology. Public participation is a shorthand term that 
embraces a range of ways in which citizens can be involved in decision making.  In 1969, 
Arnstein recognised that participatory processes allow for different levels of influence and 
proposed a ‘ladder of citizen participation’.  At the top of the ladder is ‘public participation in 
the final decision’ and at the bottom ‘public right to know’, with participation increasing with 
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movement up the ladder38. Since then, authors have applied their own categorisations to 
participatory activities. Black, for example, identifies a range of participation from ‘thin’, 
taking in transparent procedures and traditional consultation exercises, to ‘thick’, 
encompassing deliberation and consensus-based decisions and solutions39.  McCracken and 
Jones place participatory activities into three categories; ‘proactive’ (for example, 
environmental impact assessment), ‘active’ (for example, the keeping of registers and 
responding to requests for information) and ‘passive’ (for example, data monitoring and 
publication via the internet)40. Holder, on the other hand, proposes two theories of participation 
based upon ‘information’ and ‘culture’41.  The former correlates with ‘thin’ participation and 
has a limited effect upon decisions, whereas the latter sees public opinion as forming part of 
the decision-making procedure and is akin to ‘broad’ participation.  Direct involvement in 
decision making, law making and litigation, the ‘culture theory’, ‘broad’ and ‘proactive’ forms 
of participation can be placed at the top of Arnstein’s participation ladder, whereas the ‘thin’, 
‘information theory’ and ‘passive’ forms rest at the bottom.  It is clear that the greatest areas 
of conflict between the public participation ideology and the ideologies of public interest and 
private property will arise with the types of participation towards the top of the ladder.  Private 
property interests will not wish to see affected members of the public involved in decisions 
relating to their property and nor will public administrators wish to devolve their decision 
making powers to the uninformed public. 
In identifying the public participation ideology, McAuslan sees its value in terms of 
contribution to democracy and justice.  This third constituency is, if you like, what remains 
after the interests of private property ownership and public officialdom are accounted for and 
it is seen as equitable that the remaining part of society should have a part to play in decision 
making.  However, there are also practical arguments for involving the public in law making 
in general and in planning decisions in particular.  Decision making by planners and technocrats 
may overlook important local knowledge42 and local input can be vital in solving complex 
problems relating to a proposed development43.  Both developers and the public can learn about 
the controversial issues involved and differences of opinion can be settled at an early stage in 
the process, meaning that the development process is conducted in a way that is sensitive to 
the local community and less likely to meet with opposition44.  
5.1 The Entrenchment of Public Participation in Law and Policy 
Despite McAuslan’s conclusion that public participation in planning was dominated by the two 
other ideologies of private and public interest and his observation that the public participation 
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ideology was nascent at the time of his writing, mechanisms for public participation did then 
exist and, in many respects, planning law was well developed in this sense in comparison, for 
example, with other areas of environmental protection. Registers of planning applications had 
been kept since 1948 and these were the oldest record containing information on the 
environment open to the public.  Limited provisions also existed for notification and 
consultation with interested parties in the context of development control, and there were 
opportunities for the public to be involved in development planning45.  Public participation had 
certainly entered the language of planning as long ago as the late 1960s when the ‘Skeffington 
Report’ ‘People and Planning’46 was published. However, over the past three decades or so, 
requirements for public participation across all areas of government activity have seen a 
significant increase and the notion of involving the general public in decision making has 
become entrenched in many areas of law and policy, not least in environmental decision-
making. 
This movement has to a large degree been led by Europe both by the European Union (EU) 
and the United Nations Economic Committee for Europe (UNECE).  Freedom of information 
in environmental decision-making, an essential pre requisite and cornerstone of public 
participation, has been a feature of EU Law since a 1990 Directive47 and since this time, there 
has been a series of EU Directives containing provisions for procedures informing or 
enabling the public48.  Furthermore, public participation is a recurrent theme in EU policy 
making and this can be noted in the Environmental Action Programmes as well as the EU 
Governance White Paper49. One of the most significant recent developments in the field of 
public participation is the UNECE ‘Aarhus Convention’50.  The Convention implements 
principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development and is commonly 
described as comprising three pillars; public access to environmental information, public 
participation in environmental decision-making and public access to justice in environmental 
matters.  Both the European Union and the UK have implemented the Convention and it is 
clearly the case that planning law in England and Wales falls within its ambit51. 
 
At a national level, aside from legislation implementing EU provisions, the public 
participation requirements of the town and country planning legal framework have been 
enhanced over recent years and provisions in the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act, 
2004, the Planning Act, 2008 and the Localism Act, 2010 have all had a significant impact 
upon public participation in planning matters. Alongside the introduction of legislative 
provisions for participation, government policy and guidance have echoed the call for public 
involvement in planning decisions52 and, as shall be seen, the courts have also turned their 
attention to the question of adherence with public participation requirements. In assessing the 
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position of the public participation ideology in current day planning law, the main area under 
examination will be development control.  This is the realm in which development of the 
ideology is most recognisable and consequently where there is most likely to be a 
recognisable shift in the dominance of the respective ideologies.   
 
6.  Development Control 
 
There are multiple layers of public participation requirements in the process of application for 
planning permission for a proposed development.  The Town and Country Planning Act, 
1990 requires an applicant, in the first instance, to give notice to owners, leaseholders and 
agricultural tenants53 and the Local Planning Authority (LPA) is required to take into account 
any representations from these parties54.  The courts have taken a firm stance on the need to 
comply with notice provisions as can be seen from the case of R (On the Application of 
Pridmore and Others) v Salisbury DC55.  Distinguishing the facts before him from those of 
the Court of Appeal decision in Main v Swansea City Council56, Newman J quashed the grant 
of planning permission by the LPA.  Notice had not been given to another landowner and a 
false certificate had been submitted by the applicant.  Mr. Justice Newman was of the view 
that preserving the permission, under the Court’s discretionary power not to quash, would 
come close to undermining the mandatory scheme of the legislation. 
 
The system of planning registers alluded to above allows for public inspection of all 
applications for planning permission and all the information relating to such applications is 
now available for public scrutiny through the web-based government planning portal57.  In 
terms of publicity, whereas requirements were limited under the Town and Country Planning 
Act of 1971 to two classes of application (those regarded as nuisances and those affecting a 
conservation area or listed building), there is now a broad duty upon LPAs to publicise all 
applications58.  There are different publicity requirements dependent upon the category of 
development59 and special requirements for applications concerning conservation areas and 
listed buildings60. 'Paragraph 2' applications require the highest level of publicity. These are 
for developments, which require an environmental statement, are contrary to the development 
plan or affect a public right of way. For such applications both a site notice and a notification 
in the local press are required. For 'major developments' either a site notice or neighbourhood 
notification is required along with notice in a local newspaper. For all other developments, 
the LPA has the choice between site notice or neighbourhood notification.  However, 
accompanying guidance advises that this last category of application may warrant newspaper 
publicity for certain kinds of development61.   
 
The accompanying guidance also gives general encouragement to LPAs to go beyond the 
legal minimum in ensuring that the public are made aware of applications for planning 
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permission. However, the courts have been reluctant to interfere with the judgment of the 
LPA on mechanisms for publicity. In the case of R (On the Application of Seamus Gavin) v 
London Borough of Haringey62, Richards J was of the opinion that the LPA did not even have 
to consider which method would best give notice of the application to interested parties63. In 
refusing an application to quash the planning permission, the court found that, although 
discretion to choose between site displays and neighbour notice was conferred64, there is no 
obligation upon the LPA to assess each individual case and determine which is the best 
method of publicity. Furthermore, the LPA was within its rights to adopt one method 
as general practice as long as the policy was not so rigidly applied as to fetter its discretion 
and it was prepared to consider reasons for departure from policy in any given case. 
 In the case of neighbour notifications, the Order requires that the owners and occupiers of 
any land adjoining that to which the application relates be notified. The LPA can extend 
neighbour notification more widely and clearly has the discretion to do so. This raises the 
question as to how this discretion should be exercised and the degree to which LPAs' 
decisions in this regard are open to challenge. The Gavin case above would seem to suggest 
that such a decision can only be challenged on the grounds of irrationality. The restriction to 
notification of owners and occupiers of adjacent land can raise particular issues in terms of 
high visibility large structures such as wind turbines and the question as to the breadth of 
population materially affected by such a development and the legality of restriction of 
notification to immediate neighbours is one yet to be fully tested in the courts65. 
 
Publicity requirements fall in the category of provision of information and sit low on the 
ladder of participation. Publicising applications for planning permission will only allow for 
meaningful participation if the public are given the opportunity to make representations. 
Current town and country planning legislation allows for written representations to be made 
to the Planning Committee66. At the end of the publication period there are three weeks in 
which such submissions can be made. Any concerns raised during this period are presented to 
the Development and Control Committee and are material considerations that must be taken 
into account in the decision-making process67. The law stops short of providing a right for the 
public to be heard, although there is a public right to attend planning committee meetings68. 
There are no legal rights for the applicant, objecting parties or members of the public to 
address the planning committee meeting, although it is common practice for committees to 
allow objectors to speak. The Government has encouraged local authorities to allow parties to 
address planning committees69, however, practice across local authorities varies, with some 
not giving the opportunity for interested parties to be heard, whilst amongst those who do 
there is no common procedure70.  The minimum period of three days for committee reports to 
be available for public inspection prior to the meeting, also restricts the ability of interested 
parties to prepare cogent oral submissions. Most significantly, any opportunity for an oral 
hearing will only arise where determination is made by a planning committee, whereas the 
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great majority of applications are delegated to officers for decision, which is made purely on 
the basis of written representations71.  
 
The advent of the Human Rights Act has brought no change to the position on the right to 
oral representation in planning. The higher courts have held that Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human rights does not require there to be an oral hearing before a decision is 
made by the LPA on grant of planning permission. However, in the case of R (On the 
Application of Adlard and Others) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions72, Simon Brown LJ, in the leading judgment, did acknowledge that, in 
exceptional circumstances, denying an objector sufficient hearing may bring the courts to 
conclude that the LPA had acted unfairly or unreasonably. The view that an oral hearing is 
not required to comply with Article 6 was confirmed in the House of Lords in Begum (FC) v 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets73, where Lord Hoffmann made clear that an oral hearing 
would not be necessary, even if a planning committee were required to make findings of fact. 
 
There are further opportunities for representations to be made by the public at the point of 
appeal. Applicants for planning permission have the right to appeal against both the decision 
and any conditions imposed74. Appellants have the right to a hearing, which can take the form 
of either a formal public inquiry or an informal hearing. In practice, however, most appeals 
are dealt with by way of written representations, by agreement between the appellant and the 
LPA. Should a hearing proceed, those who have responded to the publicising of the 
application have the right to make submissions, present evidence and cross examine75. 
Although there is no right for the general public to participate in appeals, inspectors do have 
the discretion to allow other parties to appear and will generally facilitate this. As with 
appearance before the planning committee, there is a potential problem here with 
inconsistency in practice across local authorities. There is no corresponding right of appeal 
for objectors to the grant of planning permission or attendant conditions. 
 
The question of third party rights of appeal in planning matters has long been a thorny one. 
There have been calls over many years for a change in the law in order to allow, at the very 
least, a qualified right of appeal for objectors76. However, the government has systematically 
rejected any change in the law to allow third party rights of appeal77. One of the main 
justifications for maintaining the status quo is based upon the premise that democratically 
elected councillors represent their communities in planning matters78. This argument, 
however, neglects the inequity raised by a situation where the decision of a democratically 
accountable body to refuse permission can be overturned on appeal, whereas the decision to 
grant permission cannot79. Also, as previously noted, an increasing number of applications 
are determined by officers rather than by planning committee, thus, to a degree, removing the 
democratically accountable element of the decision. The lack of a third party right of appeal 
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has been tested in the courts under Article 6 of the Human Rights Act - the right to a fair 
hearing. However, the House of Lords, in the Alconbury80 cases, ruled that the right to a fair 
hearing had not been denied to the claimants, because of the nature of the process and 
because the Inspector was required to justify his/her decisions. It is easy to see the hand of 
private interest here. It is commonly recognised that the main reason behind the resistance by 
government to a third party right of appeal lies in the extra time and cost this would impose 
on the system of development control81 and in parallel to this, the extra burdens that might 
ensue for developers. 
 
6.1 Planning Policy 
Planning policy as always played a significant role in underpinning the planning system of 
England and Wales. Over recent years the number of individual Planning Policy Statements 
(PPS) has increased at a rapid pace, with no less than 25 in place before the recent 
assimilation into one single policy document. There are repeated references to public 
participation in the separate statements, but of particular significance are the principles on 
participation to be found in PPS1, which advocates that the public be given an important role 
in the planning system82, through early involvement in proposed developments and effective 
participation once planning permission applications have been submitted83. PPS12 on Local 
Spatial Planning gives guidance on 'Statements of Community Involvement'.  It is notable 
here that the statement also requires statements to reflect both early and lasting community 
involvement throughout the whole planning process84. The policy on renewable energy 
(PPS22) also emphasises the importance of public participation in development procedures. 
Principle 1 (vii) states that the public should be engaged, in particular by developers, before 
applications for planning permission are submitted85.  In parallel to the PPS22, government 
policy on renewable energy also notes the importance of the public's role in planning law 
procedures to ensure the goals of new renewable energy infrastructures86. The government's 
2009 strategy draws on the Killian Pretty Review, which recognised the importance of local 
community involvement before a planning application is made87 and to facilitate this, the 
strategy recommends that developers and LPA agree on a 'Planning Performance Review' 
including measures to ensure a deliberative and effective dialogue is established between all 
relevant parties, before an application is made88. 
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As can be seen in some of the examples cited above, public participation recommendations 
have become firmly embedded in both planning policy and broader government policy. 
Furthermore, there is a strong emphasis upon engaging the public at an early stage of the 
development, thus facilitating the possibility of meaningful input into the decision making 
process. This kind of involvement moves up the ladder of public participation towards public 
involvement in the final decision and 'culture theory' models of participation89. The 
publications referred to here are policy and strategy documents, which provide guidance and 
direction rather than having legal status. However, the former PPSs played a significant role 
in the determination of planning permissions, being a material consideration in the decision 
making process. This said, in most cases, there will be a large number of, often competing, 
considerations to be taken into account in any given decision. As mentioned previously, the 
PPSs have now been replaced by a single policy document, the National Planning Policy 
Framework (NPPF)90. This much reduces the quantity of guidance at the hands of the 
decision maker and aims to simplify and consolidate government planning policy. The most 
prominent position of public participation guidance is in the section on local plans. Paragraph 
155 states that 'early and meaningful engagement and collaboration..... is essential' and that 'A 
wide section of the community should be proactively engaged' and in Paragraph 157, the 
NPPF sees it crucial that local plans should 'be based on co-operation with....... public, 
voluntary and private sector organisations'. The new policy document does not, however, 
echo this advice for public participation in development control decisions, where no mention 
is made of engaging the public at any stage of the procedure. As with the predecessor PPSs, 
the NPPF will be one of a number of material considerations to be taken into account in the 
grant of planning permission and accompanying conditions. 
 
6.2 Environmental Impact Assessment 
A significant development over recent years has been the introduction, by the EU, of 
provisions on environmental impact assessment (EIA). Where developments are likely to 
have a significant impact upon the environment, particular procedures are required, which 
include the submission of an environmental statement along with the application for planning 
permission. The introduction of EIA provided a prime opportunity for the EU and its member 
states to enhance public participation requirements for developments that have an impact 
upon the environment. This is particularly the case, given that the EU saw the EIA 
Directive91as satisfying Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention92, the most specific article on 
public participation, which relates to proposed activities that may have a significant effect on 
the environment. Article 6 (7) of the Convention requires that the public be allowed 'to 
submit, in writing or, as appropriate, at a public hearing or inquiry.... any comments, 
information, analyses or opinions that it considers relevant to the proposed activity'. Article 6 
(4) and (5) require member states to provide for early public participation when options are 
still open and effective public participation can take place and for the developers to be 
encouraged to enter into discussions before applying for a permit. These latter two articles 
were not reflected in the 1985 Directive and an amending provision was required and was 
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enacted in a 2003 Directive93. This directs member states to allow the public concerned 
effective opportunities to participate and express comments and opinions when all options are 
open to the decision-making body. It is notable that the Aarhus Convention does not provide 
for a positive obligation for the public to be heard, public hearings or inquiries only being 'as 
appropriate'. Correspondingly, neither the 1985 Directive nor the 2003 Directive grant such a 
right and the implementing regulations in the UK, as reflected in the enhanced publicity 
requirements referred to above, merely require that extra measures to publicise the 
environmental statement and other documentation are adopted at the point of submission of a 
planning application. Furthermore, although the 2003 Directive reflects the Aarhus 
requirement for early and effective public participation, there is no legal obligation in the 
implementing legislation or other UK planning provisions for any advance publicity or 
provision of information on the options before the application is lodged. 
 
With one notable exception, the courts have been reluctant to interfere with decisions 
challenged on the basis that EIA public participation procedures have not been complied 
with. In the case of R v Swale Borough Council and Medway Ports Authority, ex parte 
RSPB94, no public consultation had taken place, but, nonetheless, the court was prepared to 
uphold the decision to grant planning permission on the basis of the detrimental financial 
impact upon the developer should the decision be quashed. Similarly, McCullogh J, in the 
case of Twyford Parish Council v Secretary of State for the Environment95 (88), upheld the 
decision to grant permission on the basis of the public interest in completion of the 
development on time, which, in the court’s view, would not have happened if extensive 
public participation had been required. The short-lived high water mark in the courts' 
acceptance of the importance of proper public involvement in EIA decisions came with the 
case of Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment and Another (89). In this case, no 
environmental statement had been submitted with the planning application and the House of 
Lords saw this as sufficient reason to quash the decision, despite the argument put forward by 
the defence that there had been substantial compliance with EIA procedures. In the view of 
Lord Hoffman, in the Berkeley case, the lack of a non-technical summary in an environmental 
statement meant that the public had been excluded from any involvement in EIA decision-
making. Lord Hoffman also stressed the imperative of public involvement in EIA procedure, 
no matter how flawed their views may be. In his words; 
 
'The directly enforceable right of the citizen.... is not merely a right to a fully informed 
decision on the substantive issue. It must have been adopted on an appropriate basis and that 
requires the inclusive and democratic procedure prescribed by the Directive in which the 
public, however misguided or wrongheaded its views may be, is given an opportunity to 
express its opinion on the environmental issues96. 
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What appeared to be a culture shift in the way the courts treat public participation97 was not 
to be maintained. The decision in Berkeley was, no doubt, influenced by the fact that these 
were EU provisions and at the time the case came before the House of Lords, it had been 
accepted that the key articles of the EIA Directive have direct effect and confer a right on 
individuals, which can be pursued before their national courts98. The prediction that, even if 
there were to be substantial compliance with the terms of the Directive, there would be a very 
narrow limit on the UK courts' discretion not to quash a decision and that this might transfer 
to public participation provisions in the UK town and country planning regime was not to 
come to be99. There was a caveat in the judgment of Lord Hoffman, where he stated that 
planning permission need not be quashed when there were minor technical omissions from 
procedures. Little guidance was given as to what situations this might apply to100 and 
subsequent cases have capitalised upon the flexibility offered by Lord Hoffman's 
statement101.  In R (Jones) v Mansfield DC102, for example, the procedural requirements of 
EIA were held not to be required because of the quantity of environmental information 
already available. Carnwarth LJ , in the Jones case, was of the view that facilitation of 
decision-making could be at risk if the formal EIA procedures on public participation were 
followed103. A recurring theme emerges from cases decided before Berkeley and subsequent 
cases104, which continued to diminish the significance of the House of Lords' decision. This is 
the tension between a speedy and 'efficient' decision making process for planning matters and 
the involvement of the public in decisions that impact upon both themselves and their 
environment. 
 
6.3 Major Infrastructure Projects 
The conflict referred to above between speed and public participation is particularly evident 
in the context of major infrastructure projects. Governments have long held a desire to 
smooth the process for all development projects and for large projects in particular. As long 
ago as 1950, only a few years after the passage of the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, 
Churchill's government saw the planning system as 'much too cumbersome, too rigid and too 
slow' and pledged to drastically change it. Arguably, there has been little change of substance 
over the intervening years105 and today's government still view the system they inherited as 
less than ideal for promoting growth and as a burden in cost terms106. In truth, it is not at all 
clear that the determining of planning applications plays a significant part in time delays in 
the development process. Certainly it seems that gaining the necessary consent for 
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development is no slower in the UK than in other jurisdictions107. In one of two recently 
commissioned investigations into the planning system and competitiveness, which presaged 
the controversial changes introduced in 2008, the difficulty in distinguishing between the 
time that is necessary to make complex decisions and unnecessary delay was 
acknowledged108. 
 
Proposals to facilitate the progress of major infrastructure projects through the planning 
system have been mooted for some years. In 2001, the then government, in expressing its 
concern about the efficiency and effectiveness of the land use system, made particular note of 
the delay over major decisions, which, it believed, hindered economic growth109. The 
government published a series of consultation papers, including one on procedures for large 
scale projects, such as airports and power stations. Much of the impetus for change to 
procedures for major projects stemmed from experiences where extended public inquiries had 
caused significant delay to infrastructure projects. Perhaps the most influential of these was 
the Heathrow Terminal 5 project, the delays to which were broadly thought to be as a result 
of community participation. This is probably a misconceived view, much of the delay being 
attributable to the developer (BA took over a year to present the initial case) and the 
government110. As Lord Falconer commented in the House of Commons 'Much of the hearing 
on Terminal 5 was about international airport policy'111. Under the proposals put forward in 
2001, Parliament would debate the merits of the case and the detailed design would be the 
subject of a public inquiry, which would not be able to overturn the decision of Parliament. In 
terms of public participation, the government saw this as being carried out at a very early 
stage and there would be no effective voice in the actual determination. Whilst early 
involvement of the public is a positive step towards meaningful participation in decision-
making, in order to achieve this result it must be coupled with both continuing and later 
consultation and decisions should take into account the outcomes of the whole spectrum of 
public participation112.  
 
The 2001 government proposals, in the end, did not come to fruition, but in 2005 new Major 
Infrastructure Inquiries Procedure Rules were introduced with the intention of speeding up 
the process, 'whilst continuing to ensure that adequate opportunity is given for people to have 
a say, to test evidence and make a sound decision'113. Only a few years later proposals were 
underway for a radical change to the procedure for determining major infrastructure 
applications. The Planning Act, 2008 introduced a fast track system for such proposals, with 
minimal opportunity for public participation. The provisions in the Act relating to major 
infrastructure projects were influenced both by general political frustration and two reports 
commissioned to explore the impact of the planning process on competitiveness both of 
which recommended the speeding up of the way major infrastructure was provided114. 
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Despite the reassurance by Hazel Blears MP at the second reading of the Planning Bill that 
'At every stage it will reinforce the democratic principle that everyone should have a fair say 
on the future of their neighbourhood'115, public participation and accountability in the new 
system are both weak and opportunities for this to happen are significantly diminished. The 
new system is underpinned by a series of National Policy Statements (NPS) on the key areas 
of infrastructure provision. The content of these can be location specific, but the consultation 
requirements are such as the Secretary of State 'thinks appropriate' and he/she must simply 
have regard to the responses116. There is no provision for an oral hearing or for members of 
the public to make oral representations, even when the particular location for a project is 
identified in the Statement. This is particularly significant, given the weight that is accorded 
to the NPS. Whilst development plans in the local planning regime are a key component of 
the decision making process, they are balanced against other material considerations, 
including representations of the public. Whereas, in effect, an application for development 
consent for a major infrastructure project must be determined in accordance with the NPS, 
subject only to four specific exceptions117. There is, however, an obligation for the developer 
to consult with the public before bringing forward an application118. Such early public 
engagement reflects the principles of the Aarhus Convention and has the potential to move 
participation up the ladder, however, it is only a requirement to consult and there must be 
doubts as to impartiality here as well as to whether there will be a meaningful response from 
the developer119.  
 
Decisions on major infrastructure projects under the 2008 Act were to be taken by a new 
independent body, the Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC). The powers of the IPC 
were wide ranging, including the creation or extinguishing of rights and compulsory purchase 
of land120. Whereas the predecessor large public inquiries for major projects allowed for full 
participation of the public, the IPC's examination (with some very limited exceptions) took 
the form of written representations only. The basis of any claim to a right to be heard for the 
public comes from a provision requiring an 'open-floor' hearing. However, this kind of forum 
simply allows members of the public to make statements and there is no opportunity in the 
system for cross-examination. It was the government's view that the opportunity to question 
engenders 'an unconstructive culture of opposition among parties'. The life of the IPC was 
short lived. The Conservative Party Manifesto stated its intention to dismantle the 
Commission and in due course, the Localism Act, 2010 abolished the IPC from the date of its 
coming into force and transferred its assets and functions to the Secretary of State121. In 
practice now the decisions on major infrastructure projects will be delegated to the Planning 
Inspectorate (PIN), under the same procedures provided for by the 2008 Act. Another 
provision of the 2010 Act ensures that NPSs can be voted on in Parliament122. 
 
On the face of it, large scale public inquiries did provide the opportunity for meaningful 
public participation in the spirit of the Aarhus Convention. However, the balance has now 
swung in favour of speed and the much needed development of the UK economy. This shift 
away from public participation may appear to be dominated by the private interest of 
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developers, but, in fact it is heavily entwined with the ideology of public interest. The 
location of the decision-making function, in practical terms, with PIN means that public 
officials are making decisions on infrastructure projects, supposedly in the public interest. 
The argument that the view of the public is accounted for by decisions taken by 
democratically elected bodies was entirely void during the brief period of the IPC's life. To a 
degree, this has been rectified with the Secretary of State taking on the functions of the IPC, 
which has effectively meant a return to the former system by which the Secretary of State 
made the final decision upon receipt of a report from the planning inspector. The Secretary of 
State is accountable to Parliament and thus to the public, although the degree to which this 
system truly reflects democratic accountability or public involvement in decision making on 
such important matters is debatable.  
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
The provisions in planning legislation for notice and publicity might seem to reflect an 
enhanced position for the ideology of public participation.  Certainly the publicity requirements 
are more comprehensive than they were in 1980.  Notice requirements are, however, a part of 
the planning regime originally designed to protect the interests of private property owners and 
the firm stance of the courts in upholding such requirements can thus be seen as a reflection of 
the traditional private property interest dominance.  The enhanced publicity requirements might 
be viewed as signifying a move towards both public interest and public participation.  However, 
there remains a good deal of discretion in the hands of the Local Planning Authority to choose 
their method of publicity and to determine the range of neighbour notifications, which restricts 
the effectiveness of these measures in terms of public participation. It seems that, in fact, this 
is an area where the public interest ideology is dominant, with control lying firmly in the hands 
of the public body.  
 
Notice and publicity requirements have little contribution to meaningful public participation if 
they are not accompanied by the right to make representations.  This is seriously undermined, 
in the first instance, by the discretion on publicity operated by LPAs mentioned above.  
However, the most significant limitation lies in the lack of any right to an oral hearing.  Most 
decisions are taken by officers based entirely on written representations and where the public 
are allowed to participate in person, there is no established procedure and inconsistent practice 
across LPAs.  There has always, of course, been the right for applicants to be heard on appeal 
and this forms another facet of the development of a regime with mechanisms inherent to 
protect the interests of private property.  The right to be heard by other parties at appeal is 
restricted to those who have made representations, limited, as noted above, by the LPA’s 
discretion on publicity requirements.  The absence of any third party right of appeal against a 
planning decision underlines the continued dominance of private property interests at the direct 
expense of public participation. 
 
On the face of it, it would seem that in policy and guidance terms, public participation has a 
high status.  The public participation rhetoric has become well rehearsed and embedded in 
guidance documents over the past three decades or so.  However, this has been diluted more 
recently in the condensed version of planning guidance now to be found in the National 
Planning Policy Framework.  Planning guidance remains just one of many material 
considerations to be taken into account in the making of a planning determination and, as was 
noted by McAuslan it provides little by way of legal requirement123.  Government guidance 
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remains part of the balancing act undertaken by the LPA, which can be paid lip service to and 
manipulated to pursue either the public interest agenda or the interests of private property. 
 
The development of environmental impact assessment procedures brought the opportunity for 
the European Union and its member states to fully integrate public participation into at least 
part of the planning process.  However, despite the fact that the EU saw its EIA provisions as 
compliant with the newly introduced Aarhus Convention, it is submitted that they do not reflect 
the spirit of the Convention.  In particular, the lack of requirements for advance publicity and 
the absence of any right to be heard leave the EU Directive and its implementing legislation in 
England and Wales lacking in terms of the goal of meaningful public participation that 
underpins the Convention.  Looking at the case law to date on EIA, with one notable exception, 
the courts have taken the traditional private property interest line. 
The conflict between the public participation ideology and the private interest ideology is very 
evident in the cases relating to EIA and a consistent theme is the supposed incompatibility 
between public participation and speedy decisions and swift development. 
 
The issue of public participation holding up development is most prominent in high profile 
major infrastructure projects.  It is in this area that we see a significant shift towards the private 
interest ideology in 2008 with the introduction of the Planning Act and its fast track process 
for the approval of major infrastructure projects and the loss of the opportunity for the public 
to participate in large scale public inquiries.  This was the high water mark for the triumph of 
private interest over public participation.  However, the effective shift of decision making to 
the Planning Inspectorate, introduces an element of public interest into the equation.  What is 
patently clear is that in this area of development control the public participation ideology is 
extremely weak. 
 
What difference then between 1980 and today?  Opportunities were certainly lost in the 
introduction of EIA and the courts have failed to take up the gauntlet of public participation 
post Berkeley.  Furthermore, the doors to public participation in major infrastructure project 
developments appear to be firmly closed.  Despite the increase in profile and entrenchment of 
public participation in policy and law, in practical terms it remains subservient to the private 
and public interest ideologies.  The status quo prevails with the public interest allowed to 
operate in some limited areas, but always under the terms of private interest. It seems that 
despite all that has happened in this area of law, little has changed in the balance between these 
three legal ideologies and McAuslan’s overarching conclusions, at least in respect of the law 
and guidance on development control, remain good today.   
 
 
